The Stop and Frisk Doctrine in Washington and the Rise and Fall of Independent State Constitutional Analysis by Walters, Kurt
Washington Law Review 
Volume 64 
Number 1 Dedication to Professor Charles E. 
Corker; Symposium on State Constitutional Law 
1-1-1989 
The Stop and Frisk Doctrine in Washington and the Rise and Fall 
of Independent State Constitutional Analysis 
Kurt Walters 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kurt Walters, Comment, The Stop and Frisk Doctrine in Washington and the Rise and Fall of Independent 
State Constitutional Analysis, 64 Wash. L. Rev. 179 (1989). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol64/iss1/11 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright Q 1989 by Washington Law Review Association
THE STOP AND FRISK DOCTRINE IN
WASHINGTON AND THE RISE AND FALL OF
INDEPENDENT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS
Abstract: As the United States Supreme Court expanded the scope and intensity limits
of the stop and frisk doctrine, the Washington Supreme Court, in 1984, applied independ-
ent state constitutional analysis and held that article I, section 7 of the Washington State
Constitution provides greater privacy protection in stop and frisk cases than the United
States Constitution. Since then, however, the Washington court has abandoned its reli-
ance on article I, section 7 in the stop and frisk context. This Comment examines this
transition and concludes that the federal stop and frisk doctrine may not adequately pro-
tect fundamental privacy rights, and that the Washington court should return to
independent state constitutional analysis to remedy this deficiency.
The evolution of the stop and frisk doctrine in the Washington
courts paralleled Terry v. Ohio I and its progeny for more than a dec-
ade. However, as the United States Supreme Court continued to
decrease protection of privacy rights by expanding the scope and
intensity limits of Terry, the Washington State Supreme Court, in
1984, broke from federal constitutional law and applied independent
state constitutional analysis to a stop and frisk case. In State v. Wil-
liams,2 the court exercised Washington State's sovereign right to
determine that article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitu-
tion3 affords greater protection for individual liberties than does the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.4 Since Williams,
however, the court has abandoned independent state constitutional
analysis in stop and frisk cases and has returned to an analysis that
parallels the federal Terry doctrine. An examination of this transition
1. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer
may stop a suspect on less than probable cause if the officer believes that criminal activity may be
afoot, and may frisk the suspect if the officer reasonably believes that the suspect may be armed
and presently dangerous. Id. at 30. To justify a stop and frisk, the officer must be able to point
to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
support the intrusion. Id. at 21. A subsequent frisk of the suspect is permissible only when "a
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or
that of others was in danger." Id. at 27.
2. 102 Wash. 2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984).
3. Id. at 741-42, 689 P.2d at 1070. Article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution
provides: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law."
4. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). A majority of state
appellate courts have held that their state constitutions provide more protection of civil rights
than does the United States Constitution. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System:
Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND
L. REv. 491, 499 (1984).
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shows that the court's recent decisions in the stop and frisk context are
not entirely consistent with even the minimal privacy guarantees pro-
vided by the fourth amendment. This analysis also shows why the
Washington court's reliance solely on federal doctrine in stop and frisk
cases may not ensure the optimal level of privacy protection for Wash-
ington citizens. To provide the proper level of privacy protection,
while still accommodating law enforcement needs, the Washington
court should return to independent state constitutional analysis in stop
and frisk cases.
I. THE WASHINGTON COURT'S VENTURE INTO
INDEPENDENT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS IN STOP AND FRISK CASES
A. State v. Williams
On April 7, 1981, a Kirkland police officer responded to a residen-
tial burglar alarm and observed a car parked in front of the house
from which the alarm emanated. As the car began to drive away, the
officer blocked the car's path with his squad car. He ordered the
driver, John Williams, to turn the car off, throw out the keys, and
place his hands on the roof of the interior of the car.' Less than one
minute later, a backup officer arrived. Williams was then ordered to
exit his car, frisked, handcuffed, advised of his rights, and placed in
the back seat of the patrol car. One of the officers approached the
house and found that the front door was unlocked.
The officer returned to the patrol car and asked Williams what he
was doing in the area and why he had attempted to drive away from
the house. By the time the officer questioned Williams, approximately
five to ten minutes had passed since the stop began.6 After questioning
Williams, they searched the house and discovered that a burglary had
occurred. Williams was arrested and driven to the police station. The
officers did not ask him to identify himself until after he arrived at the
station. The total length of the stop was approximately thirty-five
minutes.' Williams was convicted of second-degree burglary and first-
degree theft, and the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed.' A five-
member majority of the Washington Supreme Court reversed,
5. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d at 734-35, 689 P.2d at 1066.
6. Id. at 741 n.4, 689 P.2d at 1070 n.4.
7. Id. at 735, 741 n.4, 689 P.2d at 1066-67, 1070 n.4.
8. Id. at 735, 689 P.2d at 1067.
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rejecting the state's contention that Williams' detention was a valid
Terry stop.9
The court based its decision on two independently sufficient
grounds: The purpose and the intensity of the stop. It reasoned that
the purpose of the stop was not sufficiently related to Williams' deten-
tion, primarily because the officers used the opportunity to search for
evidence rather than question Williams.1" The court focused on the
failure of the police to question Williams more fully at the inception of
the stop. It held that virtually no circumstances warranted a Terry
stop without the police immediately seeking the suspect's identity,
purpose for being in the area, and possible involvement in a crime."1
The court also concluded that, although some emergencies may arise
that require continued detention of a suspect without first questioning
him, a standard burglary investigation is not among those situations.1 2
The court also held that the severity of the intrusion, or intensity of
the measures exercised by the officers, exceeded the permissible
bounds of a Terry stop. It concluded that the suspected crime of bur-
glary did not automatically justify the degree of force used against
Williams. The court held that handcuffing and confining Williams
was improper, although it did not prohibit such procedures in every
Terry stop. Rather, the court stated that drawn guns and handcuffs
are permissible only when the police have a reasonable fear of dan-
ger.1" In addition, it concluded that under some circumstances hand-
cuffing, confinement in a squad car, and drawn guns may be
permissible during a Terry stop; but because the officers in Williams
did not articulate a reason for believing that Williams was dangerous,
the measures employed against him were unreasonable.14
B. Williams' Departure from Federal Law
Some of the procedural rules established by the court in Williams
were a clear departure from the majority of federal-jurisdictions and
imposed a significant limit on police discretion that did not exist under
federal stop and frisk law.15 The Williams court created limits on the
purpose of a Terry stop, the prerequisites to be met before more intru-
9. Id. at 741-42, 689 P.2d at 1070.
10. Id. at 740, 689 P.2d at 1069.
11. Id. at 740-41 & n.3, 689 P.2d at 1069-70 & n.3.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 740 n.2, 689 P.2d at 1069 n.2.
14. Id. at 740, 689 P.2d at 1069.
15. See Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of "Stop" and "Arrest," 43
OHIO ST. L.J. 771, 812 (1982).
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sive measures could be exercised, and the intensity of the measures
exercised by the officer.
1. Williams' Limitation on the Allowable Purpose of Terry Stops
The Williams court limited the purpose of the initial detention in a
Terry stop to questioning of the suspect, unless exigent circumstances
are present. 16 Prior to Williams, the United States Supreme Court had
rejected the proposition that police generally must question the sus-
pect before more intrusive measures are exercised. 7 In addition, there
was a clear consensus in both federal and state courts when the court
decided Williams that officers may pursue collateral evidence-gather-
ing objectives under the authority of Terry that extend beyond mere
questioning of a suspect even when there are no exigent circumstances
and the severity of the suspected crime is not serious.1 8
2. Williams' Intensity Limitations
The Williams court also established restrictions on the police's use
of handcuffs and confinement in the patrol car during an investigative
stop that the federal courts had not recognized. The United States
Supreme Court has never held that the use of handcuffs exceeds the
intensity limits of Terry. Although the Williams court's holding was
consistent with Professor LaFave's analysis of the issue,19 other courts
that have addressed the issue have held that handcuffs do not necessar-
ily convert a Terry stop into an arrest.2 °
3. Williams' "Least Intrusive Means" Requirement
The Williams court also required that the investigative methods
employed by police in a stop should be the least intrusive means avail-
able to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion. 21 This least intrusive
means limit is analytically distinct from the intensity limits imposed
by the Williams court. An officer can violate the least intrusive means
requirement even if the severity of the intrusion does not violate the
16. See Williams, 102 Wash. 2d at 740-41 & nn.2-3, 689 P.2d at 1069-70 & nn.2-3.
17. In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972), the Supreme Court upheld an
investigative stop where a police officer reached into a car and removed a handgun from a
suspect's waistband without questioning him first.
18. Williamson, supra note 15, at 812.
19. 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 9.2, at 366-67 (1987).
20. E.g., United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 1982) (handcuffing of
robbery suspects did not convert investigatory stop into arrest), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211
(1983).
21. State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 738, 689 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1984).
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intensity limits of Terry. In the least intrusive means analysis, it is the
sequencing of the various means employed that is determinative. In
other words, the officer must exercise the least intrusive means that
theoretically could have achieved the officer's objective. If the officer
could have dispelled his or her fear for safety by frisking the suspect
rather than, for example, handcuffing and confining the suspect, a
court applying a least intrusive means test would invalidate the stop.
Like the Williams court's limitation on the acceptable purpose of
Terry stops, the least intrusive means aspect of Williams also
restricted law enforcement agencies more than federal law. Although
the Williams majority believed that the United States Supreme Court
had imposed such a requirement in Florida v. Royer,22 the Court had
actually rejected the proposition that an officer must use the least
intrusive means in a Terry stop more than a year before Williams was
decided. In Michigan v. Long,23 the Court noted that "we have never
required police to adopt alternative measures to avoid a legitimate
Terry-type intrusion,"'24 a position that it has explicitly reaffirmed
since Williams.25
II. THE RETREAT FROM RELIANCE ON ARTICLE I,
SECTION 7 IN THE STOP AND FRISK CONTEXT
Just one month after Williams was decided, the court's membership
changed significantly. Four justices who had not participated in Wil-
liams joined the court: Justices Goodloe, Callow, Durham, and
Andersen. Observers predicted that the new court would take a dis-
tinctly more conservative approach.26 In State v. Kennedy,27 those
predictions were realized as the court abandoned independent state
constitutional analysis in the stop and frisk context.
A. State v. Kennedy
On the afternoon of September 17, 1982, Officer Adams drove to
Rob Smith's house to investigate neighbors' complaints of heavy
pedestrian traffic. Adams noticed a car parked near the house with a
passenger in it. A license plate check revealed that the car belonged to
22. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
23. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
24. Id. at 1051 n.16.
25. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985) (availability of less intrusive
measures does not necessarily invalidate a Terry stop).
26. Eg., Whitely, Supreme Court Will Begin Session With Changed Lineup, Seattle Times/
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Dec. 2, 1984, at Dll, col. 1 (Sunday ed.).
27. 107 Wash. 2d 1, 726 P.2d 445 (1986).
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Sue Sison, Michael Kennedy's girlfriend. An informant had told
Adams that Kennedy regularly purchased marijuana at Smith's house
and that Kennedy sometimes drove his girlfriend's car.28
As Adams watched, Kennedy left the house and drove away.
Despite the lack of any suspicious behavior, Adams stopped Kennedy
because he suspected that Kennedy had purchased marijuana.2 9
When Kennedy pulled over, Adams saw him lean forward, as if he
were attempting to place something under the front seat. Adams
ordered Kennedy out of the car, but allowed his girlfriend to remain
inside. Adams reached under the driver's seat and found a plastic bag
containing about one and a half ounces of marijuana. Kennedy was
arrested and convicted of possession of marijuana, and the Washing-
ton Supreme Court affirmed.3"
The Kennedy court confronted two distinct stop and frisk issues:
Whether the initial stop was justified, and whether the subsequent car
search was permissible. In upholding the stop,3' the court assessed the
totality of the circumstances and held that there were enough facts to
support Adams' suspicion that Kennedy had purchased marijuana at
Smith's house. The second stop and frisk issue concerned the subse-
quent search of the car. In holding that the search was permissible
under Terry, the majority held that Kennedy's "furtive gesture" of
leaning forward in his seat created a reasonable suspicion that he
might be hiding a weapon. 32 Although Kennedy was not in a position
to gain immediate access to the alleged weapon after Adams ordered
him from the car, the court reasoned that his girlfriend could have
grabbed the weapon. Consequently, the court upheld Officer Adams'
search of the car, holding that the protective frisk rationale of Terry
justified a search of the passenger compartment for weapons.33
B. Kennedy's Retreat From Independent State Constitutional
Analysis
Because the United States Supreme Court had already resolved both
of the stop and frisk questions presented in Kennedy,34 the case was an
ideal test of the Washington Supreme Court's commitment to
28. Id. at 3, 726 P.2d at 447.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 4, 13, 726 P.2d at 447, 452.
31. Id. at 8, 726 P.2d at 449.
32. Id. at 11, 726 P.2d at 451.
33. See id. at 10-13, 726 P.2d at 450-52.
34. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1983) (under certain circumstances, Terry
authorizes a protective search of a car passenger compartment); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 147 (1972) (Terry stop may be justified by informant's tip).
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independent state constitutional analysis in the stop and frisk context.
While the Williams court's reliance on article I, section 7 showed that
it sought to protect privacy rights more vigorously than did the United
States Supreme Court, Kennedy signaled a distinct retreat from that
position. The majority's reliance on the fourth amendment rather
than article I, section 7 was just one indication that the court's balanc-
ing of privacy and law enforcement interests had shifted after Wil-
liams. The court's philosophical shift was also evident in its rejection
of the Williams court's limit on the purpose of Terry stops.
L The Abandonment of Independent State Constitutional Analysis
The Kennedy court's most fundamental break with Williams is its
implicit rejection of independent state constitutional analysis. Three
years before Kennedy, the United States Supreme Court in Michigan v.
Long 5 held that when a state court decision appears to rest primarily
on federal law, or is interwoven with federal law, the Court will pre-
sume that the decision is not based solely on state constitutional
grounds and is therefore not insulated from review.16 The presump-
tion that the state court is not relying upon an independent interpreta-
tion of its state constitution can be rebutted only if there is a "plain
statement" clearly indicating that the court based its decision solely on
independent state grounds, and that the federal precedents cited in the
opinion were used only for guidance.37 It is apparent that the Ken-
nedy court rejected independent state constitutional analysis because it
interwove federal and state law without including a "plain statement"
explaining that the federal law cited was only for the purpose of
guidance.3 8
2. Rejection of Williams' Limit on the Purpose of Terry Stops
The Kennedy ruling also implicitly rejected the Williams court's
limit on the purpose of a Terry stop. Except for emergency situations,
Williams limited Terry stops to investigatory questioning to identify
the suspect and purpose of being in the area.39 Despite the fact that
both of these functions were unnecessary in the stop at issue in Ken-
35. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
36. Id. at 1037-41; Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State
Power, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1501-02 (1987).
37. 463 U.S. at 1041-42; Althouse, supra note 36, at 1501-02.
38. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 4-13, 726 P.2d 445, 447-52 (1986).
39. See State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 740-41 & nn.2-3, 689 P.2d 1065, 1069-70 &
nn.2-3 (1984).
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nedy, 4 the court upheld the stop. Officer Adams had known Kennedy
for thirteen years and had been investigating him for several months.4"
In addition, Adams already had concluded before the stop that Ken-
nedy was in the area to buy drugs. Thus, the "explanation" purpose of
Terry was never present.42
3. Stretching the Limits of the Fourth Amendment: Federal
Precedent and the Car Search Issue
The philosophical shift of the Washington court since Williams is
most clearly illustrated by the Kennedy court's treatment of the car
search issue. An examination of the majority's analysis shows that, far
from offering heightened privacy protection in stop and frisk cases, the
new court ultimately misapplied the test that the United States
Supreme Court had established to govern car searches conducted
under the authority of Terry. The rule that established those limits
was delineated by the United States Supreme Court in Michigan v.
Long.43 In Long, the Court addressed the same issue that faced the
Kennedy court: the constitutionality of a protective search of a car
compartment during a Terry stop. Despite the fact that Kennedy con-
tains no reference to Long, the Kennedy court's protective search
rationale mirrors the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in
Long. 4
In Long, two police officers on night patrol stopped a car that they
observed being driven erratically by Long. As the officers approached
the car, Long exited and met the officers at the rear of the car. When
the officers asked him for his license, he went back to the car to
retrieve it. The officers followed Long, and they noticed a hunting
knife on the floorboard of the car. Fearing for his safety, one of the
officers frisked Long but found nothing. He then shined a flashlight
into Long's car and saw an object protruding from an armrest. The
officer reached in and lifted the armrest, under which he found a
pouch of marijuana. The United States Supreme Court upheld the
search, holding that once a car is lawfully stopped, a police officer may
search anywhere in the passenger compartment where weapons may
be hidden if the officer possesses a reasonable belief that the suspect is
armed and dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon.45
40. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d at 17-18, 726 P.2d at 454 (Dolliver, C.J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1983).
44. Compare id. at 1045-52 with Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d at 9-13, 726 P.2d at 450-52.
45. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049.
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Professor LaFave has strongly criticized the Long Court's analysis,
arguing that it is a potential subterfuge, vulnerable to misapplication
by both police and lower courts.4 6 This vulnerability can be traced to
three fundamental deficiencies in the decision. First, Long does not
obligate police to attempt to minimize potential danger. Second, Long
invites lower courts to presume that every suspect has "break away"
ability to gain access to the car compartment. Finally, it grants too
broad an authority for police and lower courts to overstate the danger
of persons suspected of committing relatively minor offenses.47
The most significant flaw that LaFave finds in Long is that the
Court did not obligate police to take any steps that would minimize
potential danger.48 For example, the Court could have required an
officer to order all occupants from the vehicle whenever feasible to
reduce the risk that they could reach a weapon in the car. Omitting
this requirement allows the unscrupulous officer to create a continuing
danger that establishes the predicate to search the car.49
Police and lower courts can also find authority in Long to overstate
a suspect's ability to gain access to the passenger compartment after
being ordered from the car.50 Although the suspect in Long was visibly
dazed and in the presence of two police officers, the Court nonetheless
assumed that he might break away from the officers and grab a
weapon inside the car. Thus, courts so inclined can read Long as sup-
port for the proposition that every suspect is presumed to have "break
away" ability, even if the suspect is confined in the police car.51
Finally, because the only offense that Long was suspected of com-
mitting was drunk driving, 52 the Court may have implicitly given
police and lower courts too much discretion to overstate the possibility
that a suspect may be armed and dangerous.5" Long arguably sup-
ports the proposition that persons suspected of nonviolent offenses
presumptively threaten the safety of police. Furthermore, the fact that
Long had a hunting knife on the floorboard does not necessarily mean
46. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 19, § 9.4, at 531.
47. Id. at 531-32.
48. Id. at 532.
49. Id
50. See id at 531-32.
51. Id. at 532-33.
52. "A drunken driver is indeed dangerous while driving, but not while stopped on the
roadside by police." Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1061-62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 19, § 9.4, at 534-35.
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that the officers had any reason to believe that he intended to use it
against them.54
Although the Kennedy majority did not cite Long, its analysis of the
car search issue was nonetheless a straightforward, but incorrect,
application of the Long rationale. It also illustrates two of the three
fundamental deficiencies of Long discussed by Professor LaFave.
First, the Long rationale does not require the police to exercise meas-
ures that would minimize the possibility that a suspect could gain con-
trol of a weapon.55 When Officer Adams ordered Kennedy from the
car, reducing his ability to access the passenger compartment, Adams
allowed Sison to remain in the car. LaFave's analysis also suggests
that Adams may have used Sison's continued presence in the car as an
excuse to conduct a warrantless search.56 Alternatively, one cannot
discount entirely the possibility that the majority's analysis of Sison's
presence in the car is nothing more than a post hoc rationalization for
the search, a possibility raised by LaFave.57
LaFave's second argument, that the Long rationale allows police
and courts to overstate the danger of persons suspected of nonviolent
offenses, is also manifested in Kennedy. There are no facts to support
the proposition that either Kennedy or his girlfriend caused Adams to
fear for his safety. Most significantly, Adams never claimed that he
believed he was in danger, and the facts do not warrant such an infer-
ence. If Adams feared for his own safety, he presumably would have
frisked Kennedy-but he did not. Because the court concluded that
Kennedy did not have the ability to grab a weapon from the car com-
partment, it focused its attention on Sison, finding that there was a
possibility that she might grab the "weapon" that Kennedy allegedly
placed under the driver's seat.58 This pivotal assumption is baseless.
Adams' actions show that Sison's presence did not cause him to fear
for his safety. If, as the court assumes, Adams feared that she might
grab a weapon from under the seat, he could have exercised the most
obvious protective measure by ordering her out of the car. Moreover,
the majority did not discuss Adams' own admission that he stopped
Kennedy because he thought Kennedy had bought marijuana.59 As
54. Id. Possession of a hunting knife was not a crime under Michigan law when Long was
stopped. Long, 463 U.S. at 1052 n.16.
55. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 19, § 9.4, at 531.
56. Id.
57. "Long can easily be read by lower courts so inclined as conferring on police the power to
make extensive vehicle searches without probable cause incident to virtually any lawful stopping
of a vehicle." Id.
58. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 11, 726 P.2d 445, 451 (1986).
59. Id. at 3, 726 P.2d at 447.
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the dissenters argued, the facts strongly point to the conclusion that
the search was not conducted out of a concern for safety at all, but was
merely a "fishing expedition" for marijuana.'
C A Rule Proposal Consistent With Independent State
Constitutional Analysis of Kennedy
The fundamental flaw in the Kennedy majority's analysis of the car
search issue is its failure to require the state to show that Officer
Adams justifiably feared for his safety, a requirement of the "car frisk"
rule in Long. Aside from the Kennedy court's misapplication of the
Long rationale, it passed up an opportunity to fashion a rule based on
independent state constitutional analysis that would have provided
heightened privacy protections, while still addressing the needs of law
enforcement. The proposed rule would still permit an officer to frisk
any occupant of a car when the officer reasonably believes that the
person is armed and dangerous. Assuming that the suspect is seated in
the car, the officer would be permitted to frisk the suspect and any
area of the passenger compartment within the suspect's immediate
reach, or the area from which the suspect might grab a weapon. How-
ever, authority to search within the car would cease when the suspect
has exited the car. The officer would have full discretion to frisk the
suspect either inside or outside the car.
The proposed rule is superior to the Long rule for three reasons: It
reduces the likelihood of subterfuge, is more consistent with the nar-
row authority to search recognized by the Terry Court,6 ' and provides
a clear and workable guide for police. To minimize the possibility of
subterfuge, the rule would limit the potential area within the car in
which the officer may search, thereby reducing the probability that the
unscrupulous officer will be rewarded by an evidentiary windfall. The
incentive to use the rule as an excuse to conduct a warrantless search
would therefore be diminished. The proposed rule is also more consis-
tent with Terry, where the Court merely recognized a very limited and
"narrowly drawn authority" to permit a frisk for weapons so that the
officer could protect himself.62 Another positive aspect of the pro-
posed rule is that it is workable, providing a clear guide for both police
and courts to determine the permissible scope of a search. It estab-
lishes an unequivocal bright line test: if the suspect is seated in the car,
the officer may search the area within the suspect's immediate reach.
60. Id. at 17-18, 726 P.2d at 454 (Dolliver, C.J., dissenting).
61. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
62. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
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Once that suspect exits the car, the predicate for a car search is gone.
In addition, the rule does not attempt to micro-manage the police
officer's conduct. In this respect, it is consistent with the Long major-
ity's position that the officer should not be required to pursue less
intrusive alternatives before conducting a protective frisk.6 3
III. THE RETREAT CONTINUES: STATE V WHEELER
The next stop and frisk case to come before the Washington court
confirmed the retreat from independent state constitutional analysis
that began with Kennedy. In State v. Wheeler, 4 the court clearly indi-
cated that it would no longer provide greater privacy protections in
Terry stop cases than was afforded by the United States Supreme
Court.
A. State v. Wheeler
In October 1981, Seattle police received two 911 calls. The first
caller reported that she had just seen a man "checking out" a neigh-
bor's house.65 She said the suspect left and then returned to the house
with a companion. The caller then saw the two men run into a neigh-
boring yard. The second caller reported that she saw a man run past
her window, discarding his jacket and gloves as he ran. Two police
officers responded to the calls. When they arrived at the scene, a wit-
ness told them that one of the suspects was a few blocks away. The
officers drove the indicated distance and stopped Wheeler, who fit the
witness' description. They told him he was "being held in custody" on
suspicion of burglary.66 Wheeler was frisked, handcuffed, and placed
in the patrol car. The officers then drove him two blocks to the scene
of the reported burglary. Only after the officers returned with Wheeler
to the scene did they learn that a burglary had in fact occurred. Until
that time, the only question the officers asked Wheeler was his name.67
Wheeler was arrested and convicted of second degree burglary. Five
members of the Washington Supreme Court upheld Wheeler's convic-
tion, holding that the severity of the intrusion did not convert the stop
into an arrest and that the police did not violate either the fourth
amendment or article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. 8
63. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052 n.16 (1983).
64. 108 Wash. 2d 230, 737 P.2d 1005 (1987).
65. Id. at 232-33, 737 P.2d at 1006.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 237, 737 P.2d at 1008.
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Because Wheeler did not challenge the justification for the stop, the
only stop and frisk question that the court addressed was whether the
officers exceeded the intensity limits of Terry when they handcuffed
and confined a burglary suspect, and then transported him to the scene
of the crime. In concluding that these actions did not violate the
bounds of Terry, the majority held that such intrusive measures were
appropriate in Wheeler, but not in Williams, because the purposes of
each stop were distinguishable6 9 The court reasoned that, whereas
the purpose of stopping Wheeler was to detain a suspect whose
appearance matched the description given by an eyewitness, "no inves-
tigation had been focused" on the suspect in Williams.70 Therefore,
while the Williams court held that the use of handcuffs and confine-
ment in a squad car was excessive under the circumstances, the
Wheeler court apparently believed that these same measures were
appropriate here because of the degree of certainty that Wheeler had
been involved in a burglary. 1
The Wheeler court also held that handcuffs were appropriate
because Wheeler was confined in the patrol car. The court reasoned
that placing a suspect in a patrol car necessarily creates a volatile situ-
ation in which an officer can always possess a reasonable and articul-
able fear of danger.72
The court also held that moving a suspect during a Terry stop is not
by itself impermissible. Recognizing that jurisdictions disagree on the
propriety of transporting a suspect, the Wheeler court chose to adopt a
"middle ground" position. This position maintains that transporta-
tion of a suspect so that witnesses may view that suspect is permissible
only when police know a crime has been committed.7' Applying this
rule, the court held that driving Wheeler back to the scene of the
alleged burglary was permissible since a crime had been reported.74
B. Analysis of Wheeler
1. Similarities Between Wheeler and Williams
The operative facts of Williams and Wheeler were very similar. In
both cases, the police believed that the suspect had committed a bur-
glary. In both cases, the police failed to question the suspect, apart
from ascertaining his name. Finally, both Williams and Wheeler were
69. Id. at 235, 737 P.2d at 1007-08.
70. Id.
71. See id.




handcuffed and confined in a patrol car. But unlike Williams, Wheeler
was transported by police from the area of the stop. In light of the
similarity of facts and issues, a plain reading of Williams could have
led to a reversal of Wheeler's conviction.
The Williams court held that, absent exigent circumstances, a Terry
stop is unconstitutional under article I, section 7 if police fail to ques-
tion a suspect before exercising more intrusive means. The Williams
court expressly stated that "the normal burglary investigation" does
not qualify as an exigent circumstance.75
As in Williams, the police in Wheeler handcuffed the suspect and
placed him in the patrol car. In rejecting these measures, the Williams
court held that handcuffs and confinement in the squad car are appro-
priate only in extreme circumstances, where the officer has a legitimate
fear of danger.76 As in Williams, the police in Wheeler did not articu-
late a reason for believing that the suspect was dangerous. Neither
Williams nor Wheeler made any furtive gestures or responded to the
police violently. Furthermore, the Williams court held that the sus-
pected crime of burglary alone did not support an inference that Wil-
liams was dangerous. And like Williams, the officers in Wheeler found
no evidence of a crime when they frisked Wheeler.77
2. Unconvincing Distinctions Between the Facts of Williams
and Wheeler
In light of the key similarities between the facts of Williams and
Wheeler, it is difficult to distinguish convincingly between the two
cases. Although the Wheeler court distinguished between the "pur-
poses" of the stop in each case, the court failed to recognize that the
fundamental facts in both cases were the same: a police officer stopped
a suspect because he had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that
the suspect was involved in a crime, but there was no probable cause
to support an arrest.
Despite the Wheeler court's assertion to the contrary, the investiga-
tion in Williams had undeniably "focused on the person detained.", 78
If it had not, the police would not have been justified in stopping the
suspect. By definition, a police officer must possess an individualized
and articulable suspicion regarding every person subjected to a Terry
stop.79 Accepting the argument that the investigation in Williams had
75. State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 740-41 & n.3, 689 P.2d 1065, 1069-70 & n.3 (1984).
76. Id. at 740 & n.2, 689 P.2d at 1069 & n.2; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 27 (1968).
77. Wheeler, 108 Wash. 2d at 233, 737 P.2d at 1006.
78. Id. at 235, 737 P.2d at 1007-08.
79. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980).
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not "focused" on the suspect necessarily leads to the conclusion that
the police had no legal justification to stop Williams.
3. The Propriety of Handcuffs in a Terry Stop
The basis for the Wheeler court's conclusion that handcuffs are per-
missible whenever a suspect is confined in a police car is also question-
able. This rule is the functional equivalent of holding that, as long as
police find some way to get a suspect into a police car during a Terry
stop, they then have authority to handcuff that suspect.
The Wheeler court's analysis begs the central question whether the
confinement is appropriate in the first place. The court's holding is an
implicit license for the unscrupulous officer to use excessive force by
confining suspects in the patrol car, thereby creating a situation where
the otherwise illegal use of handcuffs is justified.
4. Transportation of Terry Suspects Is Arguably Impermissible
Per Se Under the United States Constitution
There is United States Supreme Court precedent that supports the
proposition that transportation of a suspect during a Terry stop is
always impermissible8 0 In Florida v. Royer,8" detectives stopped a
suspected drug courier in an airport concourse and then escorted him
to a private room forty feet from the spot where the stop began. A
plurality of the Court held that, although the initial stop was permissi-
ble, it became an illegal arrest when the detectives took the suspect
into the private room. 2 The Court focused on the movement of the
suspect, finding that while safety concerns might justify moving a sus-
pect from one location to another during a Terry stop, the movement
of the suspect in Royer was not for this limited purpose and was there-
fore impermissible.8 3
In Dunaway v. New York 8 4 the United States Supreme Court
addressed facts very similar to those in Wheeler and held that the
transportation of the suspect was impermissible. Lacking probable
cause, the police picked up a homicide suspect for questioning and
drove him from the scene of the stop to the police station. The Court
80. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 365 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Terry
encounters must be brief; the suspect must not be moved or asked to move more than a short
distance .. "); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200
(1979).
81. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
82. Id. at 501-03.
83. Id at 504-05.
84. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
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held that the police exceeded the limits of Terry when they drove the
suspect to the station house, a conclusion that the Court had previ-
ously reachedY Although Wheeler was not transported to the police
station, the Court's analysis in Dunaway strongly suggests that the
degree of intrusion at issue in Wheeler can be supported only by prob-
able cause:
In contrast to the brief and narrowly circumscribed intrusions involved
in [Terry and its progeny], the detention of petitioner was in important
respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest. Petitioner was not
questioned [before he was transported to the police station] and placed
in an interrogation room .... The application of the Fourth Amend-
ment's requirement of probable cause does not depend on whether an
intrusion of this magnitude is termed an 'arrest' under state law.
86
The Dunaway Court stated that in Terry and its progeny the Court
had analyzed the reasonableness of the police officer's actions by
applying a balancing test rather than a probable cause standard only
because the intrusions in those cases fell "far short" of the intrusions
typically associated with arrests.87 It is hard to imagine how the stop
in Wheeler can be characterized as an event "far short" of a standard
arrest.88 The police stopped Wheeler in public and told him he was
"being held in custody on suspicion of burglary."89 They then hand-
cuffed him, confined him in the squad car, and drove him from an area
where he was legally entitled to be. Wheeler did not consent to being
transported, nor did the officers seek his consent. In any event, the
very fact that the Wheeler court was testing the limits of United States
Supreme Court precedent on the issue of transporting Terry suspects
showed that the post-1985 court was striking a distinctly different bal-
ance between the interests of privacy and law enforcement.
85. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985) (transportation of suspect to police station must be
supported by probable cause).
86. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212.
87. Id. Lower courts have disagreed on the question whether transporting a suspect to
locations other than the police station is permissible under Terry. See Commonwealth v.
Lovette, 498 Pa. 665, 450 A.2d 975 (1982) (transportation of suspect during Terry stop
impermissible), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1178 (1983); see also State v. Crowder, I Haw. App. 60,
613 P.2d 909 (1980). But see People v. Hicks, 508 N.Y.S.2d 163, 500 N.E.2d 861 (1986)
(transportation of suspect during Terry stop permissible).
88. See State v. Wheeler, 108 Wash. 2d 230, 258, 737 P.2d 1005, 1019 (1987) (Pearson, C.J.,
dissenting).
89. Id. at 233, 737 P.2d at 1006.
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C. A Rule Proposal Consistent With Independent State
Constitutional Analysis of Wheeler
If the Wheeler court had been inclined to provide greater privacy
protections by applying independent state constitutional analysis, the
court could have simply adhered to its analysis in Williams. In Wil-
liams, the court concluded that handcuffs are permissible during a
stop only when the police have a legitimate fear of danger.9" Accepting
the Wheeler court's assumption that confining a suspect in a police car
always creates a volatile situation justifying handcuffs, a clear rule to
guide police that is consistent with heightened privacy protections
would be an absolute ban on confining a Terry suspect in a police car.
Finally, because transporting a Terry suspect is highly intrusive and so
similar to a formal arrest, it would not be permitted under any
circumstances.
IV. THE WASHINGTON COURT SHOULD ONCE AGAIN
APPLY INDEPENDENT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS IN STOP AND FRISK CASES
Analysis of recent developments in Washington's stop and frisk
doctrine shows that the court has backed away from independent state
constitutional analysis, despite the fact that it could have adopted
workable rules that recognize greater privacy protections. A distinctly
different question that has yet to be addressed is whether the Washing-
ton court should, under its own standards, once again rely indepen-
dently on article I, section 7 to provide greater privacy protection in
stop and frisk cases than is provided by the federal courts. In State v.
Gunwall,91 the court announced a methodology to resolve this final
issue.
A. The Gunwall Approach
Gunwall was the Washington Supreme Court's response to what it
perceived as the unprincipled manner in which a growing number of
state courts rejected United States Supreme Court precedent in favor
of independent state constitutional analysis. 92 The court sought to
avoid being part of the growing trend in which state courts applied
independent state constitutional analysis without explaining why a
departure from federal law was appropriate. Accordingly, the Gunwall
court set forth six "nonexclusive neutral criteria" that it would con-
90. State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 740 n.2, 689 P.2d 1065, 1069 n.2 (1984).
91. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
92. Id at 58-60, 720 P.2d at 811-12.
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sider to determine when the Washington State Constitution should
extend broader rights than the federal Constitution. The criteria are:
The textual language of the state constitution; whether there are sig-
nificant differences in the texts of parallel provisions of the federal and
state constitutions; state constitutional and common law history; pre-
existing state law; whether there are differences in structure between
the federal and state constitutions; and whether the rights at issue are
of particular state interest or local concern. 9
3
B. Applying the Gunwall Criteria to Terry Stop Cases
Applying the Gunwall criteria to Terry stop cases suggests that the
Washington courts should apply independent state constitutional anal-
ysis in stop and frisk cases to provide greater privacy protection than
afforded by federal law. The Gunwall court applied its six-part test to
analyze a search and seizure case under article I, section 7. Therefore,
the Gunwall court's analysis addresses four of the criteria relevant to a
stop and frisk case: The textual language of article I, section 7; how it
differs from the fourth amendment; Washington's constitutional and
common law history; and the differences in structure between the fed-
eral and state constitutions.94 The two remaining questions concern
the fourth and sixth Gunwall criteria: Whether there is preexisting
state law which the court could rely on in future stop and frisk cases,
and whether stop and frisk jurisprudence is a matter of particular state
or local interest.
93. Id. at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812-13. These criteria were intended to ensure that, in cases
where courts apply independent state constitutional analysis, the decision would be based on well
founded legal reasoning rather than "merely substituting our notion of justice for that of duly
elected legislative bodies or the United States Supreme Court." Id. at 63, 720 P.2d at 813.
94. With regard to the first and second criteria, the court held that the text of article I, section
7 differs from the fourth amendment because the state text explicitly focuses on a citizen's
"private affairs." Thus, the court held that article I, section 7 provides greater privacy
protections than does the fourth amenment. Id. at 65, 720 P.2d at 814.
On the third issue of state constitutional history, the Gunwall court noted that Washington's
constitutional history reveals that in 1889, the Washington State Constitutional Convention
specifically rejected a proposal to adopt language identical to that of the fourth amendment. Id
at 65-66, 720 P.2d at 814-15.
The court also held that the fifth criterion, which addresses the differences in structure
between the federal and state constitutions, was satisfied. It held that, while the federal
Constitution is a grant of limited power, the state constitution imposes limitations on the
otherwise plenary power of the state to do anything not expressly forbidden by the state
constitution or federal law. As a result, the court interpreted article I, section 7 to provide
greater protection of Gunwall's privacy rights. Id. at 66-67, 720 P.2d at 815.
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L Washington's Preexisting State Law Granted Heightened Privacy
Protection
State v. Williams is one source of previous state law which unequiv-
ocally applied independent analysis of article I, section 7 to provide
heightened privacy protections in a stop and frisk case. Because
neither Kennedy nor Wheeler explicitly overruled or modified Wil-
liams, the decision satisfies the "preexisting state law" criterion of
Gunwall. In addition, the Washington court has a rich history of con-
struing article I, section 7 as a source of more privacy guarantees than
provided by the federal courts. In several search and seizure cases, it
has held that article I, section 7 extends greater privacy protections
than does the fourth amendment. 95
2. Terry Stops Are A Matter of Particular State Interest
Stop and frisk limitations also satisfy the sixth Gunwall criterion,
that the issues be of particular state concern. Ultimately, a state court
is in a better position than the United States Supreme Court to deter-
mine the needs of law enforcement within its jurisdiction. In Terry
and its progeny, the balance struck by the United States Supreme
Court established a "minimum floor" of privacy protection that
applies to every jurisdiction in the nation, irrespective of the different
needs of various law enforcement agencies. In striking its balance, the
Supreme Court took a national view, weighing the aggregate needs of
every law enforcement agency in the country. Consequently, the
Court's balancing is conducted within parameters that necessarily pro-
duce a "least common denominator" rule to guide law enforcement
96
agencies.
The fundamental problem with this approach is that the balance
struck by the Supreme Court for the nation is not always the optimal
balance for a particular jurisdiction. The needs of the police in
Wenatchee and Bellingham are simply not as compelling as they are in
the South Bronx, Miami, or Los Angeles. Washington's war on crime
is different in kind and not just degree from the crises that confront the
police in states like New York, Florida, and California. Because the
needs of the police in each region are unequal, the balance between law
95. State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986); State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d
54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986); State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984); State v.
Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 676 P.2d
419 (1984); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980); State v. Hehman, 90 Wash.
2d 45, 578 P.2d 527 (1978).
96. See Utter, supra note 4, at 525.
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enforcement and privacy interests struck by state courts should vary
considerably.
While the United States Supreme Court sits thousands of miles
away, the Washington court enjoys a unique vantage point from which
it can more clearly see the specific needs of the state's law enforcement
agencies. In theory, a better understanding of those needs ought to
result in a more sensitive application of the Terry balancing test.97
Because the Washington court is concerned with a smaller and less
complex jurisdiction than the Supreme Court, it can develop principles
more finely-tuned to local circumstances.98
Some courts and commentators have reasoned that variations in
local economic conditions logically call for varying local standards in
economic due process.99 These same authorities have concluded that
state courts are in a better position than the federal courts to construe
local economic regulations. 1" If state courts are more adept at under-
standing the myriad of complexities associated with the supply and
demand of the marketplace, they surely can better comprehend the
interaction that occurs daily between their state's citizenry and police.
With the satisfaction of this final requirement of the Gunwall test, the
court has a principled course to follow if it chooses to return to the
heightened privacy protections it previously recognized in stop and
frisk cases.
C. The Erosion of Privacy Protections in Federal Courts Creates a
Need for Independent State Constitutional Analysis
Aside from the Gunwall analysis, there are broader policy concerns
that support independent state constitutional analysis in stop and frisk
cases. A survey of the evolution of the Terry balancing approach at
the federal level reveals a bias in favor of law enforcement in its appli-
cation that is fundamentally inconsistent with the intent of the framers
of the fourth amendment, and may in the long run result in abuses of
civil rights by the majority.
Despite the Terry Court's narrow holding, the past two decades
have witnessed a dramatic expansion of the Terry rationale in the fed-
eral courts. Judge Friendly once observed that Chief Justice Warren
97. Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1324, 1350 (1982).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 272 A.2d 487, 490
(1971); see also Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53
Nw. U.L. REV. 226, 250 (1958).
100. Pastor, 272 A.2d at 490; Hetherington, supra note 99, at 250.
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"was at pains to make clear the limited character" of the holding in
Terry, carefully restricting it to the primary aim of improving the
police officer's safety.101 But despite the narrow aim of the Terry
Court, the United States Supreme Court has since struck a distinctly
different balance between law enforcement needs and privacy interests.
The Court has used the Terry balancing approach to broaden the
scope of permissible stops to situations that the Warren Court would
never have imagined. 102 The Court has upheld Terry stops for investi-
gation of possessory offenses,1"3 completed crimes, 1" detention of
property for evidence gathering purposes, 10 5 fixed patrol stops, 10 6 and
automobile searches.10 7 The Court has also held that a stop may be
justified by statistical profiles, such as the drug courier profile, 10 8 and
by an informant's tip.109 In Michigan v. Long, Justice Brennan con-
demned this ever-expanding application of the Terry balancing
rationale:
Plainly, the Court is simply continuing the process of distorting Terry
beyond recognition and forcing it into service as an unlikely weapon
against the Fourth Amendment's fundamental requirement that
searches and seizures be based on probable cause.... The Court takes a
long step today toward "balancing" into oblivion the protections the
Fourth Amendment affords. 110
Indeed, a survey of the progeny of Terry confirms that the Court's
balancing is marked by a strong and consistent deference to the inter-
ests of law enforcement at the expense of privacy concerns."' This
bias is diametrically opposed to the principles that inspired the authors
of the fourth amendment.112 The framers created the fourth amend-
ment to restrict rather than assist law enforcement authorities. 1 3 They
understood that, in times of both crisis and calm, the majority has
101. Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 37 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting), rev'd, 407
U.S. 143 (1972).
102. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257,
264 (1984).
103. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
104. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
105. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
106. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
107. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
108. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
109. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
110. Long, 463 U.S. at 1054, 1065 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. See Wasserstrom, supra note 102, at 264.
112. See 3 N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51-104 (1937).
113. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 719 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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never had difficulty protecting itself. Instead, they knew that the rights
of political, racial, and religious minorities have historically been
abused by those in power.114
Although many would argue that majoritarian abuse of the rights of
minorities is not a realistic scenario in the United States, it is worth
remembering that the majority once tolerated slavery, Jim Crow laws,
the Japanese-American internment camps of World War II, and
McCarthyism. And what role will the fourth amendment play in
preventing similar tragedies in the future? Simply put, the fourth
amendment stands as a critical bulwark against such abuses. As Jus-
tice Jackson once observed:
[Fourth amendment rights] are not mere second-class rights but belong
in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights,
none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the
individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and
seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of
every arbitrary government. 11 5
Thus, any legal doctrine that poses a long-term threat to the policies
underlying the fourth amendment should be viewed with a skeptical
eye. The manner in which the Terry balancing approach has been
used by the United States Supreme Court to dilute privacy protections
demonstrates that the stop and frisk doctrine is precisely such a force.
And while many might find the incremental advance of Terry's reach
unobjectionable, it is worth considering the observations of Justice
Bradley, who, more than a hundred years ago, warned:
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive
form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first foot-
ing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from
legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the
rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and prop-
erty should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction
deprives them of half their efficacy and leads to gradual depreciation of
the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the
duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen,
and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.' 1 6
114. In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, James Madison wrote, "[wiherever the real power in a
Government lies, there is the danger of oppression." 3 N. LASSON, supra note 112, at 78 n.91.
Madison realized that "wherever there is an interest and power to do wrong, wrong will
generally be done, and not less readily by a powerful and interested majority in a democracy than
by a powerful and interested prince in a monarchy." Id. at 78.
115. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
116. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1885).
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The Supreme Court has given no indication as to how far it will go
in balancing away our privacy rights as it continues to apply the Terry
balancing test. Although the fourth amendment has historically guar-
anteed Americans some minimum and irreducible level of privacy, the
progeny of Terry suggest that even these minimal protections are now
negotiable. And while the Washington court cannot do anything
about the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth
amendment, it can, through independent state constitutional analysis,
fill the void in privacy protections left by the Supreme Court as it
expands the scope and intensity limits of Terry. With the continuing
erosion of fourth amendment rights in the federal courts, it is impera-
tive that the Washington court look to article I, section 7 to protect
fundamental civil liberties.
V. CONCLUSION
There was a time when the Washington Supreme Court confidently
assumed it had both a right and a duty to look to article I, section 7 of
the Washington State Constitution to provide broad privacy protec-
tions that went beyond those afforded by the federal government.117
In State v. Williams, the Washington court boldly broke new ground
in an effort to preserve privacy rights in Washington during a period
when the United States Supreme Court was significantly expanding
the power of the police under Terry. Today, however, the only guaran-
tee provided by the court is that its result will conform to the minimal
guarantees of the fourth amendment.
Terry and its progeny have left a void where critical constitutional
rights once existed. Because the Washington court has refused to fill
this void with its own layer of state constitutional protections, we are
left to speculate as to what the ultimate consequences of Terry's
advance will be. The United State Supreme Court has forged Terry
into a powerful sword for use by law enforcement. In a decade scarred
by homicidal street gangs and cocaine kingpins, most Americans
undoubtedly applaud this broad grant of authority. But something has
been lost along the way. The fourth amendment sometimes sets the
worst of us free only so that we all can be free. We may have forgotten
that a sword does not discriminate between the hand of a thief and the
tongue of a dissenter.
Kurt Walters
117. Utter, supra note 4, at 524.
